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The Social Meaning of Inherited Financial Assets. Moral 
Ambivalences of Intergenerational Transfers 
Merlin Schaeffer ∗ 
Abstract: »Die soziale Bedeutung geerbten Vermögens. Moralische Ambivalen-
zen intergenerationaler Transfers«. What do inherited financial assets signify to 
heirs and testators and how does this shape their conduct? Based on grounded 
theory methodology and twenty open, thematically structured interviews with 
US heirs, future heirs and testators, this article explicates a theoretical account 
that proposes a moral ambivalence as the core category to understand the so-
cial meaning of inherited financial assets. In particular, the analysis reveals that 
the social meaning of inherited assets is a contingent, individual compromise 
between seeing inherited assets as unachieved wealth and seeing them as fami-
ly means of support. Being the lifetime achievement of another person, inher-
itances are, on the one hand, morally dubious and thus difficult to appropriate. 
Yet in terms of family solidarity, inheritances are "family money," which is used 
when need arises. Taken from this angle, inheriting is not the transfer of one 
individual's privately held property to another person, but rather the succession 
of the social status as support-giver along with the resources that belong to 
this status to the family's next generation. Heirs need to find a personal com-
promise between these poles, which always leaves room for interpretation. 
Keywords: Inheritances, meritocracy, wealth, generations, family solidarity, 
grounded theory methodology, interviews, USA. 
1.  Introduction: Inherited Assets in Meritocratic Societies 
Despite our societies’ meritocratic image, the economic impact of inheritances 
is tremendous. Leading banks are preparing for an “inheritance-wave,” because 
61 per cent of the world’s millionaires are above 56 years of age. According to 
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the “World Wealth Report” (Merrill Lynch and Capgemini 2006), these “high 
net worth individuals” are worth $33.3 trillion and 92 percent of them plan to 
bequeath their share of this wealth to their respective family members; this 
prospective wealth transfer is hitherto unknown in world history. Inheritances 
are also a socially significant phenomenon in the middle classes (e.g. Kohli et 
al. 2005), and encompass succession of family companies (e.g. Breuer 2009, 
Ch. 9) or passing on of personal objects (e.g. Langbein 2002). This article 
focuses on financial assets. While a few existing studies show that such assets 
are stratified by the usual determinants such as gender, ethnicity and education 
(e.g. Leopold and Schneider 2010; Szydlik 2004), their long-term impact on 
wealth distribution is a contentious topic in the social sciences (e.g. Morgan 
and Scott 2007; Wolff 2003). Complementing such research, this study is con-
cerned with the underlying social meaning of these transfers, i.e., what do 
inherited financial assets signify to heirs and testators, and how does this shape 
their conduct?  
Previous research by economists on bequest motives implicitly suggests 
three potential social meanings of inherited assets (for a review see Fessler, 
Mooslechner and Schürz 2008). While some claim that inheritances are simply 
random leftovers, because of individuals’ inability to predict the timing of their 
deaths (e.g. Hurd 2003), others propose that inheritances are strategic exchang-
es of assets in return for care and love in old age (e.g. Bernheim, Shleifer and 
Summers 1985). Finally, a third position holds that testators are simply altruis-
tic and care for the wellbeing of loved ones (e.g. Barro 1974). In sociology, 
love and reciprocity have likewise been suggested as motives (e.g. Finch and 
Mason 2000; Goodnow and Lawrence 2008; Kohli et al. 2005; Kosmann 
1998). All three approaches make implicit assumptions about the social mean-
ing of inheritances, i.e., if bequests were random financial leftovers, they would 
have a social meaning that parallels a lottery win – a random unexpected bo-
nus. If they were motivated by an exchange for services or reciprocity, their 
social meaning would equate that of compensation. Finally, if they were moti-
vated by altruism and love, they would have the social meaning of a gift.  
Next to the literature on testators and their bequest motives, there are also 
highly informative accounts of attitudes to inheritance and will making in the 
UK (Humphrey, Mills, Morrell, Douglas and Woodward 2010; Rowlingson 
2006), but these do not investigate the underlying social meanings of inher-
itances that give rise to those attitudes. More informative with respect to the 
social meaning of inherited assets is Janet Finch and Jennifer Mason’s (2000) 
study on inheritances as indicator of the state of contemporary family relations 
in the UK. They argue that because inheritances signify family membership 
and because there are no legal restrictions on the freedom to testate, bequeath-
ing is a practice of defining who belongs to the family. And yet, they describe 
the reception of an inheritance as signifying a stroke of luck and a sign of af-
fection, which parallels the above-mentioned implicit assumption of seeing 
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inheritances either as an unexpected bonus or as a gift. Marianne Kosmann 
(1998) analyses how women inherit in West Germany and how they fight for 
equal shares of bequests, since these signify family membership and status. 
According to her typology of heirs, the meaning of inheritances differs by type 
of heir and can be seen as safety, luck, responsibility, independence, freedom, 
gift, exchange for services, or as a legal right. But Marianne Kosmann does not 
propose a coherent framework that would account for the different meanings 
and the conditions under which they arise. While all these accounts of inher-
itances provide useful descriptions of some inheritance cases and propose dif-
ferent social meanings of inheritances, none represents an explicit investigation 
of the latter.  
Against this background, my aim is to go beyond the implicitly held as-
sumptions about the social meaning of inheritances by conducting an explora-
tive investigation of twenty open, thematically structured interviews with white 
middle class US heirs, future heirs and testators, covering roughly thirty-eight 
inheritance cases. The analysis is guided by grounded theory principles in the 
tradition of Anselm Strauss (1987; see also Strauss and Corbin 1990). Inspired 
by the above-discussed literature on inheritances, I started my investigation 
under the guiding assumption that inheritances need to be understood in terms 
of reciprocity theory. Given the predominant idea that a gift creates debt, I 
originally assumed inherited assets either to pay off debt that had arisen from 
received care and love in old age, or that inherited assets create a debt that 
cannot be repaid because the giver is dead. Hence inheritances establish indi-
rect reciprocity between generations, where parents feel a need to pass to their 
children what they had been given by earlier generations (Hollstein 2005). Yet 
early on, while conducting and analyzing a first set of five interviews in the 
Fall of 2007, I realized that a web of reciprocal relations did not govern the 
feelings and opinions expressed, nor the actions reported by my interviewees. 
That will become apparent throughout this article. Most importantly, and in 
stark contrast to the above-mentioned positive connotation of inheritances as 
gift, compensation or stroke of luck, I also encountered deeply negative ac-
counts of inherited assets as “blood money,” “fraud” and “unachieved wealth.” 
In an attempt to develop an alternative approach to the phenomenon, I eventu-
ally shifted my attention to two strands of literature which do not deal with 
everyday heirs and testators in particular, but which helped me break down the 
overall question of what inheritances signify and how this shapes people’s 
conduct. Three sets of guiding questions emerged which turned out to be fruit-
ful during the second phase of interviewing and explorative analysis in July 
2008. Those questions are derived from Viviana Zelizer’s (1994) work on the 
social meaning of money and Jens Beckert’s (1999, 2008) account of how 
inheritances have become morally ambivalent with the rise of industrialization 
and meritocracy.  
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In her general work on the social meaning of money, Viviana Zelizer (1994) 
argues that money is not a universal exchange medium, but that social scien-
tists should recognize the importance of the social meaning of money. Gifts, 
entitlements and compensations, for example, are not three interchangeable 
descriptions of a financial transfer between two persons, but are distinct types 
of transfers that correspond “to a significantly different set of social relations 
and systems of meaning” (Zelizer 1996, 481). It would be seen as highly inap-
propriate if bosses left a tip on the desk after discussing a topic with one of 
their employees, and yet it is common in many businesses to pay a performance 
related bonus. Because social relations and ways to transfer money are socially 
linked, different types of transfers work as “tie-signs” (cf. Goffman 1971, 188) 
which imply a certain relation between giver and receiver. Moreover, she 
claims that the framing of money as tip, bonus, compensation, earning and so 
on, along with the particular social relation between receiver and giver, such as 
parent/child, boss/employee or friends etc., determines how people use re-
ceived money. She gives several examples such as Christmas money not being 
meant to pay off gambling debts (Zelizer 1994, 111). Viviana Zelizer does not 
cover inherited money so that no expectations, let alone hypotheses, with re-
gard to the social meaning of inherited assets arise from her work. But in line 
with Anselm Strauss and Juliet Corbin’s (1990, 52) suggested use of literature, 
her work stimulates a guiding question, i.e., what is the nature of relationships 
within which inheritances occur and what kind of relationship does an inher-
itance signify to the parties involved?  
From a historical perspective, the succession of property rights was central 
in agrarian societies, where property in land had to stay the property of a farm-
ing group if it wanted to sustain its existence over generations, i.e., “inheritance 
involves the transmission of rights in the means of production (though the 
allodial right may ultimately be vested in a landlord), a process critical to the 
reproduction of the social system itself” (Goody 1976, 14). Under these socie-
tal circumstances, inherited property was seen as family property and this was 
its social meaning. Living generations saw themselves as stewards of the 
group’s property and because the family was organized around its economic 
function, the land represented the family and was treated as “inalienable pos-
session” (Weiner 1992, 33). Yet, with the transition from an agrarian to an 
industrialized economy, land lost its function as means of production for most 
parts of the population. Against this historical transition from an agrarian to an 
industrialized economy arises the second guiding question, i.e., where do testa-
tors and heirs see the purpose of inherited assets nowadays?  
Along with this transition to an industrialized economy went a change in the 
understanding of property now seen as individual private property (Beckert 
1999, 42). This is best explicated in Locke’s philosophy: “The labor that was 
mine, removing them [objects] out of that common state they were in, hath 
fixed my Property in them” (Locke 1988 [1689], 289). John Locke ties proper-
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ty to the idea of meritocracy, meaning that a person establishes an entity as 
property by means of labor. These individualized values of meritocratic socie-
ties contradict the inheritance of social and economic statuses, which is why 
classic scholars such as Émile Durkheim and Max Weber expected an abolish-
ment of, or at least a strong constraint on, the possibility to bequeath. However, 
as Jens Beckert (1999, 60) points out, both Max Weber and Émile Durkheim 
overlook the dilemma such a liberal position runs into. While bequests contra-
dict the principle of meritocracy, the prohibition or heavy taxation of bequests 
runs against the freedom to testate and thereby against the principle of individ-
ual private property. This dilemma results in an interesting situation where two 
opposing moral values need to be negotiated and brought to a historically con-
tingent and constantly contestable compromise. Focusing on the development 
of formalized, legal inheritance laws, Jens Beckert (2008) analyses how differ-
ent moral conceptualizations of inheritances are negotiated and brought to 
compromise in German, French and US parliamentary debates. Jens Beckert’s 
work does not tackle the question whether common everyday heirs and testa-
tors also recognize any moral dilemma of bequeathing and inheriting in merito-
cratic societies, and if so, how they deal with these moral dilemmas. This is the 
third and final guiding question for my explorative investigation.  
On the following pages, I will first describe the methodological set-up of 
this study by giving detailed information about sampling, interview technique 
and strategy of analysis. Then results are presented along seven categories that 
turned out to be central during the analysis. The final section integrates the 
findings by proposing to understand the social meaning of inheritances as being 
situated in a morally ambivalent way between unachieved wealth and family 
means of support.  
2.  Methods and Strategy of Analysis 
This is an exploratory, qualitative investigation since little is known about the 
social meaning of inherited financial assets. The investigation follows the prin-
ciples of grounded theory methodology (GTM; Glaser and Strauss 1967). The 
aim is to develop an empirically grounded theoretical account of what inherited 
assets signify, and how this governs heirs’, future heirs’ and testators’ conduct. 
In particular, the analysis follows Anselm Strauss’ (1987; see also Strauss and 
Corbin 1990) conception of GTM, which is more favorable with regard to the 
use of scientific literature. In this respect, it is important to note that the above 
literature does not provide a priori theories that I seek to test or merely illus-
trate. Instead, the literature first helped stimulate fruitful guiding questions 
(52), and now serves as a wider hermeneutic framework within which I situate 
my particular middle-range theory (Merton 1968, Ch. 2). I believe this use of 
existing literature to be in line with GTM’s three constituting elements, i.e., 
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theoretical sampling, contrasting and theoretical sensitive analysis, and simul-
taneous data collection and analysis. The contribution of these three constituent 
elements results in a research process where theoretically important constructs, 
derived from the analysis of earlier collected data, are taken as criteria to col-
lect further data. Usually the researcher is looking for either maximally or 
minimally contrasting cases that allow for comparisons. Overall, this enables 
the researcher to test inductively generated expectations and thus enables a 
methodological strategy that is both inductive and deductive.  
My initial deductive starting assumption of theorizing inherited assets in 
terms of reciprocity was not supported by a first wave of data collection and 
analysis. In contrast to the positive connotations of the meaning of inheritances 
in the existing literature, the category of a moral conflict and related negative 
connotations of inherited assets was already apparent. Through my parallel 
analysis of the gathered material and reading of literature on inheritances and 
meritocracy, I began to understand the importance of asking not only about 
(family) relations between heir and testator, but also about purpose and justifi-
cation of inheritances. This insight resulted not only in an adoption of the inter-
view guideline (listed below), but also in a theoretical interest to sample testa-
tors and future heirs in addition to heirs. Wherein do people who pass on their 
estate see the purpose of that money for heirs, and how do they justify these 
transfers? How about people who are both heirs and testators? The encourage-
ment of such adaptation of data collection instruments and sampling scheme 
indicates an advantage of GTM in Anselm Strauss’ tradition.  
2.1  Sample and Sampling Strategy 
Research on inheritances faces the problem of approaching a phenomenon 
which involves three fundamentally private and delicate topics: family rela-
tions, personal wealth and, most delicately, death (cf. Kosmann 1998, 170; 
Lettke, 2003, 163). Field access is, therefore, a difficult task.  
Initially, I accessed the field by conducting an ethnography of New York 
City’s Surrogate Court (locations New York County and Kings County) in the 
Fall of 2007. Such an approach has merits in that conflicts, which are negotiat-
ed at such courts, are highly informative about actors’ understandings of 
norms, values and expectations. Yet, the proceedings of a public court are not 
only highly technical, but also scatter a single case over many sessions at vari-
ous dates, spanning several months. Most importantly, however, heirs are most-
ly absent from court proceedings, being instead represented by their attorneys.  
These reasons speak against an ethnography of inheritance court cases if the 
aim is to understand what inherited financial assets signify to heirs and testa-
tors. Since other “natural” settings where people explain, plan or negotiate 
inheritances are usually not publicly accessible, I decided against an ethno-
graphic approach. Instead, I started to conduct open (semi) thematically struc-
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tured interviews (see below) with heirs, future heirs and testators. To do so, 
high levels of trust cannot be developed during the interview, but need to be 
established beforehand so that people are willing to talk about this intimate 
topic in the first place. Herein lies an obstacle to sampling. In order to get into 
contact with a first set of interviewees, I relied on people whom I had met 
during my one-year academic visit to the US. A first set of five interviews with 
heirs I had personal contact with was conducted and analyzed in the fall of 
2007. Starting from personal contacts, I continued in late Spring 2008 by rely-
ing on snowball sampling to collect more data, i.e., I asked my interviewees if 
they perhaps knew other heirs or bequeathers who might be willing to give an 
interview. Usually, the common acquaintance established the contact to the 
prospective interviewee via e-mail, which generated the necessary level of 
trust. The snowball sampling procedure has further advantages with respect to 
studying inheritances, because it enables interviewing persons who participated 
in the same inheritance case. Methodologically, the comparison of such inter-
view material is particularly desirable as a form of contrasting analysis of most 
similar cases. From a substantial perspective, such multi-perspective samples 
offer the possibility to study family dynamics in a better way (Finch and Wallis 
1993; Kosmann 1998, 169).  
On the other hand, this sampling procedure has the known disadvantage of 
most likely creating a biased sample of similar people originating from the 
same social milieu – birds of a feather flock together (McPherson, Smith-Lovin 
and Cook 2001). In my case this consisted initially of young, Christian and 
Jewish, highly educated white middle class Americans from the East Coast. 
GTM’s emphasis to sample theoretically can level this bias if applied appropri-
ately, because it calls for sampling of cases that are contrasting in theoretically 
relevant ways. The memos I wrote after each interview to keep hold of first 
concepts and expectations helped to purposefully look for interviewees with 
certain characteristics. Moreover, because the interviews were conducted in 
two stages, the second phase of data collection could draw on the theoretical 
insights of the first phase.  
Most importantly, this led me to successfully seek interviewees of older age 
groups and people with varying roles of heir, testator or future heir. The sample 
includes cases without any financial bequests, to cases where $2000, and final-
ly up to millions of Dollars were, or are going to be bequeathed. The profes-
sions of the interviewees reflect their high education, but also show a rather 
large variation. They are editors, artists, attorneys, real estate agents, publish-
ers, marketing coordinators, managers, musicians and academics. With regard 
to other dimensions, I was less successful in meeting the demands of theoreti-
cal sampling. A single interview each with a person living on the West Coast 
and an interviewee of Puerto Rican origin do not suggest different patterns for 
these populations. As the homophily principle would suggest, my sampling 
strategy did not allow me to interview less-educated persons or those who live 
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in rural areas of the US. People from rural parts of the US might have different 
views on inheritances since the bequest of land as the means of production 
might still be of importance (cf. Breuer 2011, §24). More problematic is the 
high educational level of my interviewees. Less educated people might be less 
sensitive to moral dilemmas connected to inheriting, so that the topic of this 
article might solely be a middle class phenomenon. Methodologically, highly 
educated interviewees can be expected to easily understand implications of 
interview questions and formulate coherent answers which makes it more diffi-
cult to find out whether an answer was given for reasons of social desirability. 
In light of this problem, I decided to first ask about the inheritance case and 
what the interviewees had done with the inherited money in a narrative part, 
before explicitly approaching the topics of justification and purpose of inherit-
ed financial assets, to impede the interviewees from making-up coherent post-
hoc stories (see below).  
In order to decide about the number of interviews that would be necessary, I 
looked for theoretical saturation, meaning the researcher realizes that the inter-
views start to produce repetitive information (Glaser and Strauss 1967, 60); 
further interviews do not generate new information but only further cases. This 
point was reached after about the fifteenth interview. I kept on interviewing 
because of the variation that I hoped would go along with it. In total, twenty 
interviews were conducted with US heirs, future heirs and testators. These 
interviews cover about thirty-eight inheritance cases. Tables 1 and 2 summarize 
the sample. To guarantee anonymity, I refrain from listing all information or 
supplementary detailed case descriptions.  
Table 1: The Fall 2007 Sample1 
ID Interview Location Sex Family Status
Inheritance 
Role Age 
Age at 
Inheritance
Inherited 
From 
Int 101 Café Male Married, one child Heir 45 
14 
25 
30 
33 
Father 
Mother 
Aunt 
Grandmother 
Int 102 Home Female Single Heir 29 30 Grandfather 
Int 103 Office Male Single Heir 27 23 Grandparents 
Int 104 Home Female Cohabitating, two children Heir 29 
Future 
bequest Grandmother 
Int 201 Office Female Single Heir 28 
(21), (25) & 
Future 
bequest 
Grandmother 
                                                             
1  IDs that start with the same cipher identify related cases, with the exception of IDs that 
start with 10. Numbers in brackets note the age when an heir may/was allowed to access 
financial assets that are/were managed in a trust for them. 
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Table 2: The Spring 2008 Sample 
ID Interview Location Sex 
Family 
Status 
Inheritance 
Role Age 
Age at 
Inheritance
Inherited 
From 
Int105 Café Female Divorced Heir 39 37 38 
Father 
Grandmother 
Int 106 Home Female 
Married, 
three 
children 
Heir, 
testator 57 
47 
47 
Aunt 
Mother 
Int 107 Skype Male Married, two children
Heir, 
testator 47 
21 
21 
27 
39 
Grandfather 
Mother 
Grandmother 
Great Aunt 
Int 108 Office Male Married, two children
Heir, 
testator 53 46 Mother 
Int 202 Skype Female Single Heir 24 
(21), (25) & 
Future 
bequest 
Grandmother 
Int 301 Home  Female Married, one child 
Heir, 
testator 61 
9 (35)  
10 (35) 
Future 
bequest 
27 
Grandfather 
Father 
Mother 
 
Aunt 
Int 302 Home  Male Married, one child Testator 62 
Future 
bequest Mother 
Int 303 Home  Female Single Heir, future heir 25 
Future 
bequest 
Future 
bequest 
Grandmother 
 
Parents 
 
Int 401 Skype Male Married, two children
Heir, future 
heir, 
testator 
42 
14(28) 
35 
Future 
bequest 
Grandmother 
Aunt 
Parents 
 
Int 402 Skype Male Divorced, two children
Heir, future 
heir, 
testator 
44 
16 (30) 
37 
Future 
bequest 
Grandmother 
Aunt 
Parents 
 
Int 403 Skype Male Married, one child 
Heir, future 
heir, 
testator 
46 
18 (32) 
39 
Future 
bequest 
Grandmother 
Aunt 
Parents 
 
Int 501 Home Male Married, one child 
Heir, 
testator 81 70 Mother 
Int 502 Home Female Married, one child 
Heir, 
testator 65+
2 49+ 54+ 
Father 
Mother-in-
law 
Int 601 Café Female Married, two children
Heir, 
testator 56 
56 
55 
Mother 
Aunt 
Int 602 Office Male Married, two children
Heir, 
testator 60 56 Father 
                                                             
2  Int502 did not wish to tell me her exact age, but only provided that her age lies beyond 65. 
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2.2  Interview Type 
For this study twenty open, (semi) thematically structured interviews were 
conducted to collect objective data on inheritance cases (who received what, 
when and why), but also personal accounts of justifications, emotions or 
wherein the interviewees see the purpose of inherited assets. Moreover, be-
cause GTM relies heavily on contrasting analysis of different cases, I wanted to 
ensure to have approached certain topics with all interviewees. In keeping with 
these premises, I developed a guideline that principally divided the interview 
into a first narrative and a second thematic part. The guideline can be found in 
the Appendix.  
After clarifying the interview conditions (such as giving a guarantee of con-
fidentiality, noting that the interview would be taped, and stating my interests 
as a researcher), I started an interview by asking the interviewees to give a 
general picture of themselves, including age, work, education and their family 
background. The aim of this question was to 1. get a picture of the interview-
ees’ social background for later comparisons to other cases, and 2. making the 
respondent feel comfortable in the situation of being interviewed. This estab-
lished the necessary level of trust for the actual topic. Some follow-up ques-
tions were asked in order to complete the general picture. Following this intro-
ductory part, I started the narrative module of the interview with the opening 
request to tell me about their personal inheritance experience in detail. While I 
interrupted as little as possible, follow-up questions ensured that the narration 
covered thematically important aspects, such as who else inherited, or what the 
interviewees did with their inherited assets. This guaranteed comparability over 
the cases. I did not ask about the inherited or testated assets’ exact amount. I 
felt that this very delicate and private question could ruin the interview situa-
tion against little substantial benefit, because in one way or the other, people 
told me about the amount. At least some of the narration made clear whether 
the bequest involved small savings or large assets, as for example if an inter-
viewer noted that he used parts of his inherited assets to buy a house.  
I purposefully started with this descriptive part in order to prevent later top-
ics of justification and moral conflicts which would influence my interviewees’ 
narrations. However, the narratives often introduced a major topic that seemed 
to dominate the interviewees’ inheritance experience, such as a conflict with 
other heirs. In order to maintain the conversation/interview situation as “natu-
ral” as possible, these topics were then explored in detail instead of forcing the 
interview to follow the guideline’s chronology. While doing so, I first contin-
ued with narrative follow-up questions on what exactly happened, to only then 
ask the interviewees to explain and justify their standards and actions. The aim 
was not to confuse purpose and justifications with narrations of past actions, 
even though any retrospective of course always entails implicit justifications of 
one’s conduct. But I tried to at least separate implicit justifications of past 
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actions and explicitly stated justifications of owning inherited assets. Subse-
quently, the topics that had so far not been approached from the guideline were 
addressed. It is important to note that the interview guideline did not serve as a 
schedule, but simply helped to cover all topics, while the narrative part served 
to discover new topics which inspired the subsequent interviews. The aim was 
to pursue interviews that would limit the potential for producing socially desir-
able stories in a coherent way, be comparable enough to allow for contrasting 
analyses, but at the same time open enough to explore new topics and each 
case’s individuality within a comfortable interview situation.  
Interviews lasted between thirty minutes to an hour and a half. The length 
mostly depended on the complexity of the respective inheritance case. Some 
respondents were the sole children who had inherited from their parents. Others 
inherited several times, together with their siblings and cousins. Eight inter-
views took place in the interviewees’ homes – in their kitchen or living room – 
without the presence of other people. Four were conducted in cafés at tables 
that limited the presence of others. Three interviews took place at the inter-
viewees’ work offices. Finally, I interviewed five persons via Skype (without 
using the video function) because they were living in cities other than New 
York. The latter interview situation, while seeming suboptimal in terms of 
interaction, also offered a favorable anonymity to the interviewees.  
2.3  Coding and Strategy of Analysis 
GTM involves a complex strategy of analysis, which includes different coding 
procedures as well as memo writing and designing integrative diagrams. Again, 
it is important that all these strategies are rules of thumb and researchers need 
to develop their own style of working with the particular data at hand. My 
strategy of analysis included the following, recursively applied steps.  
After each interview, I wrote a memo on the case which entailed a short 
summary as well as first ideas about concepts, categories and potentially inter-
esting in-vivo codes (concepts used by the interviewees themselves). In the 
following days, I started to transcribe relevant passages and summarized the 
rest of the interview in the same document, so as not to overlook important 
aspects later on (Strauss 1987, 266). Indeed, during later stages of the analysis, 
I oftentimes listened to such passages again and transcribed them when they 
turned out to be important. After the transcription, I also summarized the whole 
case on one to two pages, which helped the contrasting comparison later on. 
For each of the twenty cases, I thus had a first impression memo, transcripted 
passages and summaries of the interview, and a summary of the case.  
I used ATLAS.ti to code the data. GTM emphasizes three different and ide-
ally subsequent types of theoretical coding: open, axial, and selective coding 
(Strauss 1987, 55; Strauss and Corbin 1990, 57). First, I openly coded concepts 
within each interview, without any constraints on introducing new concepts 
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and without any systematic comparison across interviews. An example of a 
coded concept is the in-vivo code “blood money,” which interviewee Int107 
used to describe his feelings towards financial assets he had inherited from his 
parents as a teenager. Another example of a concept that emerged in this phase 
was that of responsibility. Note, however, that in addition to human memory, 
ATLAS.ti offers earlier used codes to ease later comparisons. This and the 
interviewer’s memory compromise a pristine open coding of single interviews. 
While trying to “open up” the data in this way, I found the coding of dimen-
sions of concepts in terms of duration, frequency and intensity less helpful, as 
these can best be judged by comparison to other cases.  
During the next step of analysis, I reduced the openly coded concepts to a 
core set of categories, which were compared across cases. The particular cate-
gory that is compared at a time serves as the axis of the comparison, which is 
why this kind of contrasting analysis is called axial coding (e.g. Strauss 1987, 
Strauss and Corbin 1990). For example, I grouped the two above mentioned 
concepts (“blood money” and responsibility) under the category of “moral 
conflicts and anxiety” during this phase of coding. The concept of responsibil-
ity also relates to the category of “’safety net’ and capital” and thereby links it 
to “moral conflicts and anxiety.” An important part of my work during this 
phase was to analyze cases that did not fit the theory which started to emerge. 
The analysis of such cases helped tremendously to explicate the conditions of a 
certain phenomenon such as facing a moral conflict; why did not all young 
heirs face a moral conflict? As we will see later on, what creates anxiety and 
moral conflicts among heirs is insufficient knowledge about the purpose and 
responsible use of inherited assets. Below, the findings are presented along the 
explicated categories. The quoted material is illustrative, but also being ana-
lyzed within the text, so that my work of pursuing the analysis and deriving at 
the social meaning of inherited property can be retraced exemplarily.  
The final aim of GTM is to find a core category, which integrates the devel-
oped theoretical account and clarifies the relations among the various catego-
ries (cf. Strauss 1989; Strauss and Corbin 1990). The coding strategy to gener-
ate the core category is called selective coding, because few central categories 
are analyzed selectively. Since the coding strategies are rules of thumb, the 
researcher of course codes openly while already thinking about a potential core 
category for example. The core category of a moral ambivalence that demands 
for a personal compromise between seeing inherited assets as unachieved 
wealth or as family means of support is explicated in the discussion and con-
clusion section of this article. The above-mentioned category of a moral con-
flict directly relates to the core category, i.e., heirs who cannot find a personal 
compromise but see inheritances as unachieved wealth exclusively, face a 
moral conflict.   
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3.  Results 
3.1  Inherited Assets: What Characterizes a Financial Transfer as an 
Inheritance? 
According to US legal definition, an inheritance is a transfer post mortem, 
meaning it takes place after the giver’s death. But this definition does not char-
acterize the phenomenon that people see as inheritance in the US. The views 
explicated in the interviews rather support Frank Lettke’s (2003) definition of 
inheritances as a transfer of resources that is connected to the giver’s death, 
which may well include a future death. For example, one of my interviewees 
who just finished law school does not define those assets that her still living 
grandparents put in a trust for her as an inheritance from her professional per-
spective. Yet, her personal view differs, because the reasons why people set up 
a trust, saving estate taxes and ensuring an appropriate long-term use of the 
assets, link the assets to the giver’s death. For my interviewees, this qualifies 
transfers made via trusts as inheritances. Another example is the inheritance 
case of two brothers in their early forties. Their father supports them in many 
situations, such as down payments for their homes, renovations, or attorney 
costs. Usually, we would not consider such support transfers to be examples of 
inheritances. However, the father told his children about the total amount of his 
estate, explained to them that he will bequeath in equal shares, and declared 
that all support given now is credited against their future share of the bequest. 
For the two brothers the support transfers are inheritances, because they are 
declared as part of the estate they will inherit when their parents die. 
3.2  Heirs and Testators: Who Bequeaths and who Inherits? 
Quantitative studies of testaments show that testators usually pass on their 
property to their spouse, who again passes on the property to the children and 
grandchildren. The next most likely scenario is a bequest to in-laws, followed 
by bequests to second grade relatives such as aunts (e.g. Finch, Mason, Mas-
son, Wallis and Hayes 1996). In surveys, people mostly respond that they in-
herited from their parents and plan to bequeath to their children (Cox 2003; 
Humphrey et al. 2010; Schwartz 1996). Why is inheriting from the spouse not 
reported in surveys, even though it is the most frequent case and obviously 
connected to death? According to my investigation, the reason lies in the fact 
that in contrast to seeing modern society as individualized, the household of a 
married couple is still the fundamental consumption unit. Just as resources are 
shared, the bequest is planned together and so testators commonly answered in 
the plural for themselves and their spouse, even though I asked about their 
individual plans. In their everyday logic, spouses just resume the command 
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over the household’s resources; they do not “inherit” the surviving spouse’s 
estate.  
Another question that arises from such surveys is why people bequeath pri-
marily to their children and not any other caregivers or loved ones as suggested 
by theories that see reciprocity or altruism as driving motivators to bequeath. In 
contrast to altruism or reciprocity as motives, my investigation suggests that 
there is a social norm that demands a bequest to one’s children, given that there 
are assets that could be passed on: “I mean I have friends whose mothers died 
and didn’t leave them anything. I mean what a way? What a thing to do? What 
a slap in the face!” (Int106, heir and testator, age 57).  
Concerning US law there is no problem with the case described in this inter-
view, because there is freedom to testate. But the question “What a way?” 
implies that disinheriting one’s children breaks a norm, and is even conceived 
of as an insult. This suggests that children have a claim to their parents’ proper-
ty, even though we think of it as personally owned. This norm to pass on to 
one’s children is rooted in the solidarity that characterizes the relation between 
parents and children as members of one family, which is best exemplified by 
the following quote from a testator. I asked this interviewee whether she plans 
to bequeath to her nieces and nephews, as an aunt who also has own children:  
INT301: No, no not at all. Nor would [sisters] bequeath to me. I don’t feel re-
sponsible for [sister’s] children. [...] I don’t know how I’d feel if one of them 
was about to die or die straight. I’d be more likely to say: ‘Mom why don’t 
you give more money to them’, rather than me doing it directly. And honestly, 
I just wouldn’t want [daughter] to take money from [sisters]. It would make 
me very uncomfortable. It would screw up, you know, it would create an un-
comfortable sense of indebtedness I think.  
Interviewer: Indebtedness in which sense? 
INT301: Just, yeah, we’re, you know, we’re independent. We’re responsible 
for our children but not for our, my sister’s children. Yeah that would – it’d be 
weird.  
Interviewer: To whom would they be in debt? 
INT301: I think it would be more that the relationships between me and my 
sisters would get weird (Int301, heir and testator, age 61).  
This interviewee does not want to bequeath to her nieces and nephews, because 
she does not feel “responsible” for them. In turn, this implies that people be-
queath to their children because they do feel responsible for them. If there were 
a case of need in one of her sisters’ families, the interviewee would ask her 
mother to bequeath a larger share of her estate to them – a transfer that follows 
the norm that bequests are given from parents to children. This link between 
inheritances and support shows that the family in terms of parents and their 
(grown up) children is a solidarity unit, a group within which members are 
responsible for each other. “We’re independent” signifies that siblings belong 
to independent families, and supporting members of another family introduces 
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a reciprocal relation in terms of gift and debt. But such a reciprocal relation is 
explicitly unwanted, which again questions the applicability of reciprocity 
theory to understand inheritances. In sum, bequests are passed on to people 
who belong to the family and are linked with support, responsibility and soli-
darity. For this reason, receiving an inheritance signifies family membership, 
so that a bequest to nephews and nieces would signify a parent/child relation-
ship that does not exist and would thus mark the transfer as “weird.” Another 
respondent expressed a similar view, after I asked him whether he wished to 
bequeath to his “relatives”:  
Well, yes. I mean that’s part of being in a family. Each generation helps the 
succeeding generation. But you have to watch out when you use the word 
‘relatives’. In the American sense that could include cousins and you know. 
And we don’t feel any connection to those people, though if one were in trou-
ble we would help them the way we’d help a friend (Int501, heir and testator, 
age 81).  
Here we clearly see the motive of generational family solidarity. For this re-
spondent, a family is characterized by the support given by the older to the 
younger generation. But, as a solidarity unit, the family encompasses a house-
hold and its offspring and hence the interviewee draws a boundary between his 
family and other relatives. In terms of support and responsibility, the latter are 
even seen as no closer than friends.  
As discussed above, however, quantitative studies show that sometimes 
nieces or nephews and even in-laws inherit. How can this be understood within 
the framework just elaborated? There are two potential explanations which 
draw on the fact that the aunts of those three interviewees in my sample who 
did inherit as nieces and nephews did not have their own children. First, aunts 
and uncles who themselves inherited their estate, can pass on their parents’ 
estate to the next generation. In such situations, nieces and nephews in fact 
inherit their grandparents’ estate, as offspring of the original household. Sec-
ond, childless couples might develop parent/child kinds of relations with their 
nieces and nephews, as the following quote exemplifies:  
Neither of them ever had children. And my and my brother’s relationships 
with them has made them feel like we were children in their lives. And there 
is another set of cousins on another side; they probably feel the same way. 
And we provide some kind of familial outlet to them in the form of children 
(Int402, heir, future heir and testator, age 44). 
The answer parallels one of Janet Finch and Jennifer Mason’s main arguments 
that inheritance “is not so much about who ‘counts’ as kin but about the com-
mitments associated with each relationship, and especially who is treated as a 
member of the most intimate family circle” (2000, 58). In this case, the inter-
viewee and his brothers established parent/child kind of relationships by their 
affectionate behavior towards their aunts. These relationships normalized the 
bequests. Similarly, in-laws sometimes inherit, because bequeathing is a tie-
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sign (cf. Goffman 1971, 188) that testators use to express their feelings about 
the in-law having become a full member of the family. Bequeathing to in-laws 
thus is a strategy to integrate non-kin to the family, which relies on, i.e. ex-
ploits, the meaning of inheritances as a type of transfer that is made between 
generations of a family. The tie-sign can only be understood against the norm 
to bequeath to one’s children.  
3.3  Boundary Conflicts: Who Belongs to the Family? 
It is not unproblematic that inheritances function as tie-signs. The norm to 
bequeath to one’s offspring also holds with families that have experienced 
divorces and remarrying. In line with Janet Finch and Jennifer Mason (2000, 
36), my investigation suggests that difficulties arise not from divorce, but from 
remarrying. I call these conflicts boundary conflicts, because the question as to 
who belongs to the family is being contested. Such conflicts can arise for two 
reasons.  
First, the inheritance might include a person to the family against the will of 
other family members. Consequently, some family members fear the inher-
itance will “leave the family.” For example, Int102’s grandfather married three 
times. The third time, he married shortly before his death. At this time, his sons 
(Int102’s father and uncle) were already managing his estate. Some members 
of the family were resentful, because the marriage entitled his new wife to a 
third of his estate: “There was a lot of fighting between his third wife and our 
family. [...] She wanted more and we didn’t want her to have more, because 
we’re the family and she has been third wife” (Int102, heir, age 29).  
This case is an example of how the household as consumption unit, and the 
family as solidarity unit fall apart after remarrying, which results in the conten-
tious situation of who represents “real” family. The interviewee draws a clear 
boundary by which she excludes the third wife from the family.  
Secondly, boundary conflicts can arise if persons who see themselves as 
family members are symbolically excluded by not inheriting. This happened 
when Int106’s childless aunt left her assets to her sister, Int106’s mother. 
Int106 and her brother asked their mother to pass on the assets to them and 
planned to set up a trust in the mother’s benefit. Thereby, the siblings tried to 
prohibit their father to gain access to the estate, because he had an affair with 
another woman at the time. They feared he could marry the other woman and 
thereby entitle the “outsider” to their aunt’s estate. Yet, the siblings had under-
estimated that their action symbolically excluded their father from the family, 
and he felt deeply insulted. Again, these boundary conflicts can only be under-
stood against the norm to bequeath to one’s offspring, and the consequence that 
inheritances signify family membership so that bequeathing is an act of bound-
ary drawing, with its inclusive and exclusive consequences.  
HSR 39 (2014) 3  │  305 
3.4  Moral Conflicts and Anxiety: Problems to Appropriate 
Inherited Assets 
Boundary conflicts are maybe the stereotypical inheritance conflict in the pub-
lic eye. Yet my analysis revealed another highly salient personal conflict that is 
associated with inheritances. Eight out of my twenty-two heirs had difficulties 
to justify and see a purpose in inherited assets, which is why they faced prob-
lems to appropriate their inherited assets – to make them theirs. In stark con-
trast to generally held positive connotation of inheritances as gift, compensa-
tion or stroke of luck, these heirs held deeply negative accounts of inherited 
assets as “blood money,” “fraud” and “unachieved wealth.” Among these, the 
latter was the most common; heirs felt they would enjoy the merits of other 
people’s work:  
I couldn’t enjoy it, because it was what these people had worked for. And to 
really know what to do with it or how – I mean ideally your labor earns you 
capital and your capital buys you food or whatever. It was, it was – fraud. 
(Int101, heir, age 45).  
In line with meritocratic principles, the interviewee expresses that one’s food, 
which I take to represent the standard of living, should be the product of one’s 
labor, otherwise it is “fraud.” Judged against these meritocratic standards, 
inheriting entitles a person to the merits of other people’s labor and thereby 
designates them as immoral. This moral conflict becomes particularly burden-
some if heirs depend on inherited assets to maintain their family’s standard of 
living:  
I work and in some sense I pretend that all that money that has been given to 
me and will be given to me doesn’t exist. Or I don’t pretend that I worked and 
done it all by myself, but I work as though I’m supporting my family. And I 
am, to a certain extend. I live in this duality, where I think about what we have 
and what we can do based upon my income (Int403, heir, future heir and testa-
tor, age 46).  
A single interviewee who inherited at age twenty-one, after both his parents 
had died within the same year, faced a related but even more fatal problem to 
appropriate his inheritance; he felt it was “blood money”:  
I felt very guilty about the money. I felt like it was blood money. I felt like 
everything that I got from it, I got because my parents died. So I would think 
of me having a cocktail or having a meal and I would think: ‘Well, they died, 
so I could do this’. And that felt awful to me (Int107, heir and testator, age 
47).  
The term “blood money” is frequently used to denote money earned by selling 
weapons or drugs; it is money that is earned on the basis of other people’s 
suffering, i.e. their “blood.” Hence this respondent’s feelings of guilt about 
possessing inherited assets do not stem from being entitled to the merits of his 
parents’ work, but from the fact that he benefited financially from their death. 
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This violates his moral standards, according to which other people’s suffering 
or death should not be the basis of personal enrichment.  
Particularly in interviews with future heirs, I encountered statements that 
parallel the depiction of “blood money.” Future heirs implicitly face a moral 
dilemma, when they imagine future gains that result from the inevitably associ-
ated death of a family member. This can create anxiety when testators wish to 
discuss their bequest plans with potential heirs, because the latter feel highly 
uncomfortable about discussing a future gain with the person who has to die, to 
realize this gain. Paradoxically, testators wish to talk with the future heirs about 
the inheritance, because they are well aware of the fact that the appropriation of 
inherited wealth is difficult. They wish to prevent later anxieties by communi-
cating the purpose of bequests and thereby also hope to ensure a “responsible” 
use. Such considerations are well advised given that some heirs face problems 
to appropriate their inheritance because of anxieties about the expectations of a 
responsible use of inherited assets:  
It’s a huge responsibility and you don’t quite know what to do with it. And it 
took me about three years to go and even speak to the bank person of the ac-
count who manages it, just because it felt overwhelming to deal with it 
(Int202, heir, age 24).  
This heir did not know how to use her inheritance, and feared not meeting the 
demands of the “huge responsibility.” Responsibility here means that other 
people hold expectations about an appropriate use of inherited assets and the 
heir has to ensure that they are not disappointed. Yet, if the particular expecta-
tions are unknown and intransparent, heirs face problems to appropriate inher-
ited assets. In this case, the heir was so overwhelmed that she ignored the assets 
for years.  
What are heirs who are unable to appropriate their inheritance doing with it? 
As we have already seen, some simply ignore their inheritances. It might seem 
as if an alternative solution would be to give it away in form of a charity dona-
tion. Yet, this is not an option for the heirs interviewed, because the assets were 
explicitly left to them in person. Not accepting the inheritance would mean to 
deny the sign of affection along with the relationship implied by the tie-sign:  
I guess my feeling was that I hated the situation and I felt very uncomfortable 
in it, but I didn’t see it as something I could get out of. [...] And I dimly knew 
that my parents wouldn’t want that anyway. As bad as I felt, I didn’t feel good 
about having the money and spending it but wouldn’t have felt: ‘Well I did the 
right thing, ‘bye mom and dad’, if I gave it away’ either (Int107, heir and tes-
tator, age 47).  
This heir expresses that to donate his inheritance to charity would have meant 
to devalue his loss. He even goes so far as to compare giving away the inher-
itance to giving away his parents themselves by saying, “’bye mom and dad.” 
He had to keep or spend the assets, and chose an extreme, i.e., he “burned 
through it”:  
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- I just burned through the money. I just wanted to get rid of it. 
- So I spent two years just hanging around. I had a really good looking girl-
friend and I drank a lot, I did drugs, we had sex a lot and I didn’t have to 
do anything. I read a lot of books. I was very depressed and lost. And it 
was really healthy for me when I went back to school.  
- Once I was making my own way, I was glad that it’s gone. (Int107, heir 
and testator, age 47). (These are three separate interview passages.)  
If there were any behavior that suggested inherited assets had no special social 
meaning it would be this heir’s. It seems as if he treated his inheritance like any 
ordinary bonus. Interestingly though, he was happy when the short period of 
ecstasy was finally over. I offer the interpretation that by “burning through” the 
inherited assets, this heir serves in fact two competing demands. On the one 
hand, he spends the assets that were meant for him. On the other hand, he 
spends the money on short-term enjoyments that leave no trace and do not 
contribute to his long-term standard of living, even though consuming “blood 
money” and being economically dependent on it was a very depressing experi-
ence. Taken from this angle, this heir’s behavior looks quite different than 
wasting an ordinary bonus. And, on the basis of this limited single case, we 
may assume that the stories about irresponsible and immoral heirs, who spend 
their inheritance on alcohol and drugs for example, might have more complex 
and morally integer standards than is generally assumed.  
Int107 is certainly an extreme case. Most heirs who are unable to either ap-
propriate or to give away the inherited assets, tend to disregard them. They 
save the assets in some bank account and some simply wish to pass them on to 
the next generation. By doing so, heirs do not use the money for their personal 
gain, while they see it as morally permissible to use them for supporting one’s 
children.  
Why does a minority of heirs face moral conflicts? My analysis suggests 
that heirs who face a moral conflict are not able to define the inheritance as 
“special money” and that this is a function of young age. Not a single heir who 
inherited at forty years of age or older reported any of the above-mentioned 
problems. The driving factor behind age is that young people wish to achieve 
independence and a social status by their own efforts. But inheritances threaten 
to undermine such achievements – a problem that older heirs who already did 
establish themselves do not face. This means that moral conflicts can be over-
come when heirs get older and become economically independent. But there is 
more to age. Young heirs tend not to have their own children for whom they 
could spend the inherited assets without profiting themselves. Having their own 
children also puts people in the situation to think about inheritances from the 
perspective of a testator and to thereby understand the purpose of inheritances. 
And finally, young heirs have had less time to talk about inheritances with 
testators and learn about the purpose of inherited assets.  
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3.5  "Safety Net" and Capital: Purposes of Inherited Assets 
The majority of my interviewees did not report any problems to appropriate 
their inherited assets and saw various purposes for them. All these purposes 
have in common that inherited money is distinguished from wealth, which is 
seen as an earned reward. Inheritances in contrast are understood as capital: 
“To outright spend it without any return is not something I know my family 
members would do. It’s not play money, it’s for productive use I would say” 
(Int202, heir, age 24).  
The first sentence of this quote describes an aspect of “burning money,” i.e., 
to spend money on something that does not last. Inheritances in contrast, this 
respondent formulates, should be spent for things that create a “return.” She 
draws a boundary between “play money” and “productive use,” with the former 
being associated with free time and fun and the latter with work and earning a 
livelihood. This means, rather than representing returns for care and love, for 
example, inheritances are financial capital that enables the owner to become 
productive and generate “returns.” Alternatively, some interviewees described 
inherited assets as “safety net,” for emergencies and situations of need. Such 
inheritances were sometimes even regarded as important for attenuating heirs’ 
risk aversion. It is well known that people who come from lower class families 
are more risk averse and thus tend not to invest in a lengthy academic educa-
tion (Boudon 1974). Inheritances are also seen as having the purpose of making 
heirs feel less restrained and strive for their goals. Finally, according to a less 
frequent view, inheritances were also seen as family-glue that helps to “rein-
force the family connection” (Int501, heir and testator, age 81). Int501 
achieved this goal by building a country house in which the family frequently 
meets and which is intergenerationally owned.  
Testators express similar views on the purpose of inheritances. From their 
perspective, however, this translates to expectations on how their assets should 
be used after their death. While testators purposefully take actions to enforce 
these expectations by measures such as setting up trusts, they similarly empha-
size not to hold any such expectations and declare the heirs’ freedom to spend 
the inheritance however they like. This results in ambivalence between the 
topics of responsibility and freedom:  
INT601: They can do with it whatever they want. I mean I have my own opin-
ions but there is not gonna be a limit. We don’t say in the will we don’t want 
them to do this and that.  
Interviewer: But still you said you don’t want them to blow it. 
INT601: If it turns out if that’s what they did. They’re pretty responsible kids. 
So, you know if they were drug addicts or something like that I would think 
differently. If their history was such that I thought they were irresponsible and 
would be irresponsible then I might change it. But I feel they are fairly re-
sponsible so far, so they can do whatever they want (Int601, heir and testator, 
age 56).  
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This interviewee and her husband plan to pass on their estate to their children 
in two steps: first, when they reach their mid-twenties and again during their 
early thirties. Thereby, they want to assure a certain “maturity” and that their 
children have money for different life-phases. Yet, she declares not to have any 
expectations, but that her children can do with the money whatever they want. 
At a closer look, however, she takes no measures to enforce expectations be-
cause her children are “responsible,” meaning that they will use the money in 
an appropriate way without any external enforcement. Another testator similar-
ly denies having any expectations about appropriate usages, but implicitly says 
the opposite:  
I think that inheritances and things like that, I think they are all money. You 
can take some portion of the money and enjoy. You know, go on vacation or 
go on, I mean spend it on something trivial. But I think that other things, may-
be you should invest it in something more meaningful. Whether that be – and I 
guess maybe my bias is towards to, you know, put it down on a house or a 
thing that will last. Cause I think that’s the intent of an inheritance (Int108, 
heir and testator, age 53).  
In blank contradiction to the interpretation developed so far, this interviewee 
suggests to spend inherited money on trivial things such as holidays. However, 
he qualifies that only “some portion” should be spent in such ways. The rest 
should be used on something “more meaningful.” His example of the “intent of 
an inheritance” is buying a house. Here we again see the topic of things that 
last and that are an investment or a financial security, in contrast to those that 
leave no trace, generate no return, and are thus “trivial.” Moreover, a house is 
maybe one of the strongest symbols of the family, suggesting that the “intent of 
an inheritance” is to spend it on the family. US testators do not acknowledge 
holding strong expectations that might be felt as a burden by the next genera-
tion. But their language implicitly shows that they do hold such expectations 
and that these are well in line with the social meaning of inherited assets as 
safety net, capital and family glue.  
3.6  Unachieved Wealth versus Family Money: Justifications of 
Inherited Assets 
The distinction between inheritances and wealth is important in order to under-
stand how meritocracy is brought to terms with practices of bequeathing and 
inheriting. Heirs and testators formulate an interesting compromise between the 
moral virtues of meritocracy and family solidarity. In particular, negative justi-
fications negate that two meritocratic hallmarks are compromised. The produc-
tive uses of the inherited assets ensure that the standard of living is self-
achieved and the undiminished strive for status achievement proves that the 
inheritance does not affect the heir’s ambition. “I mean that money allowed me 
to find a profession I love. But at this point in my life, it’s my work that is my 
income” (Int301, heir and testator, age 61).  
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This justification reflects the purpose of inheritances to be used as capital. 
Rather similarly, another heir explicitly states that by saving her inherited as-
sets for her future children’s education, she “sort of gotten over the guilt and 
tried to turn that into something more productive” (Int201, heir, age 28). To 
describe inheritances as enabling, i.e. to be productive and achieve something, 
is a frequently recurring topic, particular among those heirs who use the inher-
itance to finance their education.  
Some heirs also formulate positive justifications. These refer to family soli-
darity as a virtue, which reflects their purpose as financial security. In particu-
lar, this meant that my interviewees emphasized to be in a situation of need or 
that they use the inheritance to support family members. These justifications 
differ from the ones above because they define situations that qualify for a 
person to receive financial support in a positive vein. All these justifications 
involve a notion of inherited assets as “family money” in contrast to personal 
property. Some heirs mention this explicitly:  
I guess I try not to think of it as mine so much as opposed to family money 
that you use for now and to preserve the next generation. I think it’s a privi-
lege of my grandparents to earn it on the one hand, but also to receive it from the 
generations before them. And it’s a perpetual thing. I guess the way I think of it, 
is it’s not mine. I think it’s probably the only way to handle it. Otherwise there is 
too many moral dilemmas. I mean maybe it’s true in that regard. It’s hard to 
know you have this money and I haven’t earned it and I’m not worthy of it or 
whatever else. But, I just don’t think like that, I guess (Int202, heir, age 24).  
In sharp contrast to the earlier quoted interviewees who used words such as 
“fraud,” this interviewee explicitly denies the applicability of meritocratic 
standards, even though she recognizes the possibility of a moral dilemma. 
Instead of facing this dilemma, however, she sees her inherited assets as family 
money and thereby distinguishes them from personal property. She characteriz-
es family money as assets that should be spent for family members and that are 
a “perpetual thing”; the grandparents gave, just as they received themselves. 
Hence, we can conceive of family money as financial assets that are used to 
enable the family to fulfill its solidarity function and that are passed from one 
generation to the next. The money stays with the group, but is managed by the 
individual for current appropriate uses. This stands in sharp contrast to existing 
accounts of inheritances. Janet Finch and Jennifer Mason (2000, 98), for exam-
ple, emphasize that they have found nearly no accounts of family money in 
their qualitative investigation in the UK.  
That said, my interviewees’ attempts to justify inheritances involve a fragile 
balance. Defining inheritances as family money involves a fine-grained distinc-
tion between unachieved wealth and support. The distinction is highly contin-
gent, because it can be subject to interpretation:  
You know my son just came to me the other day and asked if I buy him a 
house one day. I said: ‘Sure, I buy you a house’. My wife stepped in and said: 
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‘No you buy your own house. But we’re happy to help you.’ And if I can help, 
I will (Int401, heir, future heir and testator, age 42).  
This quote demonstrates the importance of interpretation. First, the interviewee 
describes the well-explored topic of how it would be inappropriate to finance a 
grown-up person’s standard of living; the son has to buy his own house. Yet, 
supporting his son is justified as an instance of family solidarity. Thereby, a 
similar transfer changes its moral status from being inappropriate to being 
justified. Such quotes should not be interpreted as socially desired post-hoc 
justifications, but as typical attempts to balance meritocratic ideals and the wish 
to support family members.  
3.7  Keeping it Invested: Usages of Inherited Assets 
What do heirs do with their inherited assets? A frequent strategy is to keep it 
invested, by which inheritances fulfill their purpose as financial security. The 
investment generates interest that might be used to pay for education, for ex-
ample. In some cases, heirs put the assets in trusts or bank accounts for their 
children or grandchildren. When those reach a certain age or when the current 
holder of the estate dies, the inheritance passes on to the children without hav-
ing been spent. Some use it to actively support their own children and grand-
children. By interpreting such spending as supportive use of family money, 
moral conflicts are being avoided. There are, however, also heirs who spend 
parts of their inherited assets for themselves. Particularly younger heirs spend 
their inheritances on education. Again, such uses of inherited assets are subject 
to interpretation. One heir, for example feels bad for using her inherited money 
on rent: “Yeah I feel like it’s a waste. It’s odd, you know if it was going like to 
tuition, like if the tuition here were $20,000 or $40,000 per year then I might 
feel differently about it, but this is going to rent” (Int201, heir, age 28).  
This heir feels bad for spending her money on rent, but would feel good to 
spend it on tuition fees. We again see the topic of tuition as investment in the 
future that generates returns, while rent is not enabling, leaves no traces, and 
signifies economic dependence. Overall, the interviewee feels bad for spending 
her inheritances in an inappropriate way. However, there is room for interpreta-
tion, as the interview with another student shows:  
I mean basically it allows me, you know, the financial security to be in gradu-
ate school and not have to worry too much about – you know I make some 
money from working, but I have this other money to fall back on. I’m able to 
live by myself rather than having roommates (Int103, heir, age 27).   
This interviewee also uses his inherited assets to pay rent and even acknowl-
edges affording a comparatively comfortable lifestyle. But in contrast to the 
earlier quoted student, this heir defines paying rent as a part of his educational 
expenses and thus does not feel bad about it. This demonstrates how situation 
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specific interpretations leave spaces for individuals to find their personal bal-
ance between the two moral virtues of meritocracy and family solidarity.  
The same need for interpretation arises in cases where people use their in-
herited assets to buy a house. Since such use directly increases one’s standard 
of living, it demands justification. But a house is rather interpreted as real es-
tate, and is thus seen as another form of investment. While people do enjoy the 
standard of living that a house provides, heirs feel that the inherited money 
itself, the “important parts of the proceeds of a human life” (Int501, heir and 
testator, age 81), are preserved and passed on to the next generation:  
What we’re doing is we’re buying an apartment with the money of the trust 
and some other money. And we gonna rent it to [daughter] and her husband 
when they get married. But we’re basically investing the money as an invest-
ment (Int601, heir and testator, age 41).  
In addition to illustrating the point made above, this quote also shows another 
important aspect of investing inherited assets: the interviewee differentiates 
between the “money of the trust” and “other money.” Most heirs in my sample 
do not intermingle their inherited money with other financial assets, but “ear-
mark” (Zelizer 1994, 21) inherited assets by investing them in separate bank 
accounts, trusts or funds. This shows that the justifications given above were 
not post-hoc answers, which were invented to meet my interview questions. 
The inherited assets are felt to be special so that a need arises to distinguish 
them from other money. One couple used its inheritances, which had been 
invested in separate bank accounts, to buy a country house as a family resi-
dence. Upon my question why they wanted to use particularly these inherited 
assets, the husband answered: “Because I felt there was a direct connection 
from that money. It represented the grandparents; that the grandparents had 
been a part of this whole process even though they weren’t alive” (Int501, heir 
and testator, age 81).  
4.  Discussion and Conclusion: The Moral Ambivalence of 
Inherited Financial Assets 
This inquiry raised the question of what inherited financial assets signify to 
heirs and testators and how this shapes their conduct. Existing social research, 
mostly done by economists and sociologists, conceptualizes the meaning of 
inheritances as gifts, compensations or random financial leftovers. Yet, such 
positively connoted conceptualizations cannot account for a large part of the 
observations made here. Why would heirs emphasize not to gain personally 
from inheritances if they were gifts? Why would testators be concerned with an 
heir’s responsibility, if they were seen as earned compensation or as random 
financial leftover? And why would particularly young heirs face moral con-
flicts after inheriting and describing their inherited assets in deeply negative 
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terms as “blood money,” “fraud” and “unachieved wealth”? This explorative 
inquiry comes to the alternative conclusion that the social meaning of inher-
itances is situated between seeing such assets as unachieved wealth and family 
means of support (see Figure 1). 
Figure 1: The Social Meaning of Inherited Assets as Moral Ambivalence 
 
 
On the one hand, the moral standard of meritocracy demands appropriation of 
property by means of labor rather than by succession. Inheritances thus repre-
sent the achievement of another person, which questions their legitimacy and 
makes their appropriation difficult. This social meaning of inheritances as 
unachieved wealth helps to explain many of the observations discussed, most 
importantly the moral conflicts some heirs face, but also the negative justifica-
tions that heirs give to emphasize how they meet the hallmarks of meritocracy, 
i.e., economic independence and ambition. On the other hand, supporting fami-
ly members is also seen as a moral virtue. The family is arguably still the most 
important solidarity unit of our contemporary societies. These supportive bonds 
remain even when children are grown up. But, bequeathed assets differ from 
common familial support in that there is not necessarily a situation of need and 
hence no obvious purpose for which the money should be used. Inherited assets 
are instead seen as “family money,” i.e. a family’s collective means of support, 
which are used when need arises. In this regard, bequeathing still parallels the 
inheritance institution of agrarian societies, but what is being passed on is not 
the means of production, but the means of support. Bequeathing is the last act 
of parenting, as one of my interviewees expressed it, because it is the succes-
sion of the status as support giver along with the resources and responsibilities 
that belong to this status. Seeing financial inheritances as family means of 
support also helps to understand many observations of this analysis, such as 
why inheritances signify family membership or why heirs feel badly for spend-
ing their inheritance on rent but not for spending it on education.  
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It is important to note, however, that the social meaning of inheritances is 
not an either/or dichotomy, but a continuum of moral ambivalence within 
which heirs need to find a personal compromise. Such a compromise is not 
static and culturally pre-given. Instead, each heir’s actions leave room for in-
terpretation, such as seeing rent as part of one’s educational expenses and 
hence an investment in the future or a waste that leaves no trace. Only heirs 
who find a compromise between the two poles can successfully appropriate 
their inheritance, whereas those who fail to find such a compromise face moral 
conflicts. Testators use the word “responsible” to describe a good balance 
between meeting the expectations on the use of family money and being indi-
vidually free enough to actually put the inherited assets to use.  
This theoretical account is the result of an exploratory, qualitative investiga-
tion. While its theoretical generalization seems plausible, it is empirically ques-
tionable because of the limited sample the theory is grounded in. Most im-
portantly, there are concerns with reference to the high education level, and 
local clustering of heirs on the US East Coast. Future research thus needs to 
establish whether the patterns unearthed also hold within other US regions and 
whether the moral ambivalence of inherited assets is felt throughout all social 
strata of the US population. Another limitation concerns recent economic de-
velopments. The interviews were conducted during the very beginning of a 
financial crisis and private investors such as my interviewees had not felt per-
sonal consequences at the time. How did the financial crisis, which crushed so 
many people’s abilities to make a living, affect their relation to inherited assets, 
or maybe even forced them to use up the family’s safety net? These limitations 
all focus on the US, but another question is how far my theoretical account 
generalizes to other countries. A principal tension between the standards of 
meritocracy and family solidarity characterizes many societies, but if we follow 
Jens Beckert’s (2008) analysis of parliamentary debates on inheritance taxa-
tion, the value of meritocracy is stressed not in all countries as much as it is in the 
US. An international comparison could show whether in other countries heirs 
experience a similarly strong moral ambivalence between two, or maybe more, 
competing moral standards. A final topic for future research is how the succes-
sion and social meanings of inherited personal items (e.g. Langbein 2002) and 
family companies (e.g. Breuer 2009, Ch. 9) relate to that of financial assets.  
Appendix 
Interview Guideline 
Could you please give me a general picture of yourself? 
- Family: parents, siblings, spouse, children, grandparents etc. 
- Family’s immigration background 
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- Age and place of upbringing 
- Work and education 
Since the topic of the interview is inheritances, I am interested in your experi-
ences. Please tell me about your inheritance experiences.  
- Age at inheritance 
- Inheritance from whom 
- Who else inherited 
- What was being bequeathed 
- What do you do with the inheritance 
- How do you store it 
Have there been any conflicts on inheritances? 
- What was the contentious topic 
- Who was involved 
- What were their claims 
- Was the conflict solved and how 
- When did the conflict start 
Have you also inherited personal property?3  
- From whom did you inherit it 
- Who else inherited objects 
- Can you give me concrete examples 
- Why is the piece important to you 
- Was the object passed on in the family since more than one generation 
- Is there a story to the object 
(Added for the Summer 2008 Sample) 
- How do you feel about owning property you did not achieve yourself? 
- Have you thought about your bequest? 
To whom 
- What do you consider when you think about your bequest 
- Do you have expectations how the bequest should be used 
- Do you feel an obligation to bequeath 
- Will you also bequeath personal objects and what do you consider here 
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